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Why Economics Must be an Evolutionary 
Science 
On the evolution of evolutionary thought in economics, from Thorstein Veblen’s 
institutional approach to modern complexity and chaos theories. 
 
 
“O caos é uma ordem por decifrar.” 





This paper addresses the evolution of evolutionary thought in economics as an 
alternative to the dominant static view of the economy. 
A short history of the earlier institutional approach, announced by Thorstein Veblen’s 
1898 paper ‘Why is economics not an evolutionary science?’, is presented alongside a 
discussion of its key methodological and philosophical aspects. Veblen’s critiques of 
neoclassical economics are also discussed. Then the role of evolutionary concepts in 
economics throughout the twentieth century is analysed, from later institutionalists to 
recent complexity and chaos theories. It is argued complexity approaches are 
developed in line with Veblen’s institutional theory, and may be incorporated in an 
evolutionary theoretical framework which constitutes a necessary alternative to the 










Introduction: The Origins of Institutional Economics in Historical Context 
Institutional thought emerged in economics in the late nineteenth century, with the 
publication of ‘Why is economics not an evolutionary science?’ in 1898 by Thorstein 
Veblen. In order to analyse the evolution of evolutionary concepts in economics, it is 
helpful to briefly describe the historical context of its origins. 
Thorstein Bunde Veblen (1857-1929) was a Norwegian-American economist, born in 
Wiscounsin. Having studied philosophy and economics under John Bates Clark (at 
Carleton College) and Charles Sanders Peirce (at Johns Hopkins University), Veblen 
eventually got his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1884, with a major in philosophy and a 
minor in social studies. 
He started teaching at the University of Chicago in 1892, and developed some of his 
most important work in the following period – his Theory of the Leisure Class is 
published in 1899. He would then move to teach at Stanford University, and later at 
the University of Missouri. Veblen also worked for public organisations and magazines, 
where he met other academics such as the historian Charles A. Beard and the 
pragmatist philosopher John Dewey. 
Apart from philosophy, anthropology or psychology, Veblen also read widely in the 
natural sciences, thus becoming an enthusiast of the Darwinian evolutionary theory. 
The ideas of Peirce and William James would also influence him. 
Therefore, contemporary biology (Darwinian evolutionary theory), philosophy and 
psychology (Peirce, James, Dewey and the pragmatist theory of action) are core 
influences in the development of Thorstein Veblen’s institutional and evolutionary 
approach.  It is worth noting that by the time Veblen developed his works economic 
theory was mostly influenced by the metaphor of physics, not biology (Mirowski, 
1984). 
 
Veblenian ‘Institutionalism’ and the Critique of Neoclassical Economics 
The first feature of Veblen’s institutionalist approach considered in this essay, perhaps 
the most important one, is how it addresses the ever present dilemma of social 
sciences – the agency-structure dichotomy. One can trace this discussion at least back 
to ancient Greek philosophy. To address it properly, it is necessary to discuss the 
different metaphors used to describe social reality, as they play a fundamental role in 
the constitution of social sciences (Louçã, 1997; Hodgson, 1999). This role has been 
described brilliantly by Paul Ricoeur (1977) in his The Rule of the Metaphor: 
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“In service of poetic function, metaphor is that strategy of discourse by which language 
diverts itself of its function of direct description in order to reach the mythical level 
where its function of discovery is set free”. 
Biological metaphors of society can be found in the works of Greek philosophers like 
Plato, who described the individual as a part of a living organism (i.e. society). Authors 
from the beginnings of modern economics also grasped this notion – the French 
physician François Quesnay, in his Tableau Économique, developed a model which 
sought to explain economic dynamics by an analogy with blood circulation in the 
economic structure. 
The ascent of atomistic conceptions of society occurs in the period of the European 
Enlightenment (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). Classical economists such as 
Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say, David Ricardo, and the philosophers John Locke or 
John Stuart Mill are associated with this individualist perspective which is currently 
dominant in economic thought. 
In the nineteenth century, Karl Marx (metaphors of structure and superstructure) and 
German historicists also used the idea of society as an organism “to connote the 
existence of social structure above constituent individuals” (Hodgson, 2004). Even 
Alfred Marshal, usually considered a neoclassical economist, argued for an organicist 
metaphor, although he failed to develop it consistently. 
Veblen and later institutionalists (such as John R. Commons or Wesley Mitchell) 
introduced the concept of “institution”. Hodgson defines institutions as “durable 
systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions.” 
(Hodgson, 2006). Organisations (such as firms, unions, states, among others), laws, 
regulations, norms of behaviour, systems of language, money or social conventions are 
all institutions. These systems of rules (either legal rules, or norms of behaviour) are 
explicitly or implicitly acknowledged and accepted by the members of society. Rules 
are replicated through language and the prevalent social culture – they are ‘socially 
transmitted’. 
Veblen sought to offer an explanation on the transformation of both individuals and 
societies. He opposed the explanations of socio-economic phenomena exclusively in 
terms of individuals (that is, methodological individualism), but he also did not accept 
explanations exclusively in terms of systemic wholes. What Veblen proposed was a 
Darwinian framework to analyse the co-evolution of agents and structures, based on a 
materialistic interpretation of history. Veblen understood this evolutionary process as 
a result of causal interactions in both directions (from individual to structure and from 
structure to individual), emphasizing the historical, structural and biological aspects of 
the human condition. In order to explain origin, he conceived the individual in 
biological and socio-economic terms. 
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His Darwinian focus on ongoing processes and ‘cumulative causation’, rather than 
static equilibria, as well as the rejection of teleological explanations, can be considered 
radical approaches (Hodgson, 1998; Bateira, 2010). Veblen rejected mechanistic 
analogies and wanted to replace them with evolutionary methods and metaphors, 
thus criticising neoclassical and other schools of thought and arguing for a complete 
reconstruction of economic theory. Veblen himself (1898a) explained: 
“Any evolutionary science…is a close-knit body of theory. It is a theory of a process, of 
an unfolding sequence…of cumulative causation.” 
Although social structures depend on individuals, they are not reducible, in an 
ontological sense, to them. Yet it is also true that individual behaviour is influenced by 
social context. This means institutions and individuals are mutually constitutive. 
Veblen thus distanced from any reductionist methodology (biological, structuralist or 
individualist), as he refused to explain all aspects of complex phenomenon in terms of 
one type of unit (Hodgson, 1998). 
Institutions can affect individuals’ preferences by shaping their habits – a mechanism 
of ‘reconstitutive downward causation’ (Hodgson, 2002). Individuals can also influence 
social structures, meaning upward causation is also possible. It is important to notice 
there are some social structures which precede individual interactions - people are 
born in a society shaped by past generations. Therefore institutions and individuals are 
different entities (the former are not simple aggregates of the latter). 
The metaphors found in Veblen’s writings constitute an important evidence of his 
Darwinian framework. In the discussion of habits and institutions, the author 
frequently referred to the concepts of ‘variation’ – among populations –, ‘continuity’ – 
the mechanism involved in the transmission of individual characteristics (inheritance) – 
and ‘natural selection’ – the prevalence of the better-adapted organisms (Veblen, 
1898b, 1899, 1906). 
Hence Veblen did not neglect human’s purposes and beliefs, but understood them as a 
result of an evolutionary process similar to Darwin’s natural selection, and shared the 
biologist’s rejection of religious and teleological explanations of events. In this sense, 
preferences are not given features of an individual; they are socially (thus 
endogenously) constructed. Veblen used the metaphor of ‘mutation’ when referring to 
habits’ and institutions’ changes (Veblen 1904, Veblen 1909). This is much more than a 
mere literary choice, since mutation implies the notion of irreversibility. 
In Veblen’s approach, institutions or social structures are also a result of a materialistic 
evolution. As Hodgson states, “intentions can be causes, but intentions are always 
caused.” (Hodgson, 2004). 
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Veblen (1899) described his evolutionary perspective on socio-economic events in the 
following terms: 
“The evolution of social structure has been a process of natural selection of institutions. 
The progress which has been and is being made in human institutions and in human 
character may be set down, broadly, to a natural selection of the fittest habits of 
thought and to a process of enforced adaptation of individuals to an environment 
which has progressively changed with the growth of community and with the changing 
institutions under which men have lived. Institutions are not only themselves the result 
of a selective and adaptive process which shapes the prevailing or dominant types of 
spiritual attitude and aptitudes; they are at the same time special methods of life and 
human relations, and are therefore in their turn efficient factors of selection.” 
Human intentionality is not denied, but rather included as a necessary element of an 
interactive process between individuals and institutions (for a more detailed 
explanation of rules and social ontology, see Martins, 2009). The psychological 
mechanisms of deliberation are themselves an outcome of evolution through social 
interactions and habituation. Thus habits and routines are an essential part of the 
deliberation process, which means a rejection of the neoclassical atomistic view of the 
fixed individual. 
Veblen criticised neoclassical utilitarian explanation of human behaviour, as it did not 
explain the origin of such behaviour. “Darwinism meant not only a critique of Divine 
intervention, but it also required a rejection of immanently conceived preference 
functions.” (Hodgson, 2004). Veblen thus challenged the narrow definition of 
economics as ‘the science of choice’ – even if one attempts to analyse individual 
choices, the origins of his or her preferences need to be considered. His criticism is 
made clear by his biting comments on neoclassical approach to institutions: 
“It is characteristic of the school that whatever an element of the cultural fabric, an 
institution or any institutional phenomenon, is involved in the facts with which the 
theory is occupied, such institutional facts are taken for granted, denied, or explained 
away. (...) And yet these economists are lacking neither in intelligence nor in 
information.” (Veblen, 1909). 
The circularity of the neoclassical thesis of utility-maximizing behaviour has also been 
exposed by some authors (see, for example, Sen, 1977). 
Inherited instincts (such as fear or imitation) and habits are crucial to human 
development. Veblen approached the relation between biological instincts and socio-
economic evolution in his Theory of the Leisure Class, arguing human mental capacities 
have evolved from less deliberative forms (a Darwinian emphasis that human reason 
and deliberative capacities are the outcome of an evolution from previous and less 
conscious forms, such as habits and instincts), and were influenced by the social 
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culture (Hodgson, 2010). Thus habits and reason interact in an adaptation process to 
an ever changing environment, thus evolving and generating new behavioural 
outcomes. This pragmatist theory of action stresses that human purposes, 
deliberations and actions are primarily driven by habits (Barbalet, 2004). Habits are in 
turn dependent upon prior and inherited instincts. Veblen assumed “there is 
multidirectional, complex feedback, and intersectional processes at work in the 
instincts - habits - institutions - behaviour nexus.” (O’Hara, 2000). 
The crystallisation of individuals’ ‘habits of thought’ gives rise to institutions 
(Bögenhold et al., 2016). Institutions are durable because they impose consistency on 
human activities, by moulding (though not determining) humans’ purposes and 
preferences. Dewey described this process as “the cumulative effect of insensible 
modifications worked by a particular habit in the body of preferences” (Dewey, 1922). 
Veblen identifies three elementary propensities of the human race: ‘the instinct of 
workmanship’, ‘the parental bent’ and the ‘instinct of idle curiosity’. According to his 
view, these instincts are the primitive base for human action and deliberation (Brette, 
2003). 
Thus, human mental capacities are not conceived as static, but rather as resulting from 
a process of evolution in which agents react to institutional changes by learning 
processes. These processes of behaviour transformations influence the very 
institutional framework in which agents live. 
In his Theory of the Leisure Class, Veblen develops this idea, arguing modern 
institutions directed consumption patterns in such a way that “no class of society, not 
even the most abjectly poor, forgoes all customary conspicuous consumption” 
(Veblen, 1899). Veblen argued social standards play an important role in consumer 
behaviour. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that social structures exert considerable influence in 
human action. Each cultural environment may inhibit or encourage the expression of 
some instincts and the acquisition of certain habits. Established institutional systems 
tend to impose themselves upon agents and new institutions, by reproducing shared 
habits of thought and behaviour and creating mechanisms of conformism (Brette, 
2003). 
As Veblen (1906) wrote: 
“The economic life history of the individual is a cumulative process of adaptation of 
means to ends that cumulatively change as the process goes on, both the agent and his 
environment being at any point the outcome of the last process.” 
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The Darwinian evolutionary perspective on the complex processes involved in human 











Emergent processes and cumulative causation 
Veblen’s ‘emergentist’ conception of socio-economic phenomena consists in 
understanding the world as a result of continuous causal relations between its parts. 
These social interactions can originate systems exhibiting emergent properties (that is, 
features that are not identifiable within the parts alone). Macroeconomic systems are 
conceived as exhibiting emergent properties and causal power – novelty is an example 
of a systemic emergent property, not possessed by the parts alone. 
Davis (2017) provides a schematic representation of cumulative causality in an attempt 
to demonstrate its relevance in human behaviour analysis. In the case of agents acting 
upon habits, the action of some factor A in some other factor B also involves the causal 
relationship from A to B. It is then also the case that a -> b -> (a -> b). The combined 
overall effect is given by: 
(1) a and a -> b and a -> b -> (a -> b)’ => b and (a -> b)’. 
As Davis notices, “the linear causal relation a -> b has causal effects on itself, which are 
additional to the linear effects that a has on b.” The author adds that “cumulative 
causation processes combine continuity and non-identity of linear cause-and-effect 
sequences. Their non-identity is associated with the linear sequence part of the overall 
relation”, represented below: 
(2) a and a -> b => b. 
Figure 1. A Darwinian Conception of Human Cognition and Action (Source: Hodgson, 2010). 
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Continuity is associated with the part of the overall relation in which the linear 
sequence operates on itself: 
(3) a -> b and a -> b -> (a -> b)’ => (a -> b)’. 
The overall relation (1) combines the effects (2) and (3), demonstrating that the initial 
relation (a -> b) builds on itself, and providing an evolutionary scheme which may serve 
as an example of how habits and actions mould each other. 
The notions of cumulative causation and emergentism may explain Veblen’s analysis of 
technological change. Veblen criticised the neoclassical theory of production – the 
fiction of Robinson Crusoe – for it neglected historical and social context. Veblen 
argued that any detailed analysis of the mechanisms of production must address the 
specific organizational structures involved in the process. He stressed the complex 
organic relation between workers and production factors, thus rejecting the 
neoclassical idea that productivity could be calculated for each factor alone, as it does 
not realistically describes productive processes. As O’Hara (2000) wrote, 
“(...) the processes of production, distribution and exchange need to be situated within 
the context of the reproduction of institutions associated with belief and organisation. 
Socioeconomic reproduction implies the need for a wide scope of vision when viewing 
the production of goods and services; the distribution of income, wealth and power 
between the social classes; and the exchange of money, credit and goods and services 
in the market.” 
In this sense, technological change plays a fundamental role in the capitalist evolution. 
It depends on the capitalist system’s tendency to replace older systems of production 
for new ones, later identified by Schumpeter (though he attributed technological 
change to the figure of the ‘entrepreneur’ – an individualist perspective Veblen would 
not embrace). Nevertheless, both authors agreed capitalism was an evolving system 
which endogenously generated its own changes. 
Besides permanently changing the material conditions of production and distribution, 
technological progress also influences social relations through complex processes of 
habituation and adaptation. Veblenian notions of ‘cumulative causation’ and ‘path-
dependency’ also apply to technological progress and capitalistic metamorphosis. 
 
Evolutionary thought in 20th century economics 
Throughout the twentieth century, several authors tried to develop organicist 
approaches to the study of economic phenomena. 
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Wesley Mitchell and John Rogers Commons are the most prominent authors who 
followed Veblen´s legacy. Both authors’ works are included in what is usually called 
‘Institutional Economics’, whose main features are the study of evolutionary processes 
and the role of institutions. Commons analysed phenomenon such as collective action, 
and provided important works in the history of labour unions in the United States, 
while Mitchell, who studied under Veblen and Dewey, became known for working on 
the National Bureau of Economic and Research (NBER) and for his works on business 
cycles. 
These and other authors tried to develop the philosophical framework proposed by 
Thorstein Veblen. Mitchell argued that the calculative mentality assumed by 
neoclassical economics was historically specific (an argument shared by Max Weber, 
for example), and economics should instead deal with the institutional context that 
shapes human behaviour, criticising orthodox economists for not using psychological 
insights in their works. Mitchell’s notion of circular feedback between institutions and 
agents is consistent with Veblen’s idea of endogenous preference construction, and 
can help to explain the durability of some emergent properties. 
The significance of psychology was also stressed by John Maurice Clark (1918), who 
argued individuals were constrained by human mental limitations. Mitchell and Clark 
also developed major works concerning business cycles analysis (Mitchell, 1913; Clark, 
1917). 
It is worth mentioning by the time these authors developed their works, the 
intellectual environment in the social sciences was less favourable to the Veblenian 
framework. Positivism was becoming the dominant methodology in economics, and 
behaviourism had replaced the instinct-habit psychology. Institutionalism was 
influenced by positivism, and much more emphasis was given to empirical research 
(Rutherford, 2000). 
Later on, the evolutionist approach and metaphors were developed by such 
heterogeneous authors as Joseph Schumpeter (1934), Gunnar Myrdal (1972), 
Georgescu-Roegen (1976), or more recently Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982). 
Although not all these authors operated under a Darwinian framework, they all 
criticised orthodoxy for dealing only with the study of equilibrium states, and opted to 
analyse economic changes and processes of adjustment. 
Despite these heterogeneous efforts, the Darwinian approach was marginalized within 
social sciences, lacking a solid theoretical framework. Nevertheless, institutionalism 
influenced some later heterodox authors. The development of the foundations of a 
macroeconomic level of analysis by Wesley Mitchell and others is a major step in the 
history of economic thought. John Maynard Keynes, Nicholas Kaldor, Michal Kalecki, 
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Joan Robinson and later post-Keynesian scholars have built on this important legacy of 
‘old’ institutionalism. 
Some of the new approaches to the discipline which have emerged in the last decades 
resonate with a Veblenian evolutionary program. Such is the case of modern 
complexity approaches, which defy the neoclassical paradigm and may achieve what 
Veblen could not – that is, establishing evolutionary foundations to the study of 
economic dynamics. These will be described in the next section. 
 
“The blurring of the boundaries between order and chaos”: linking Veblen and 
complexity approaches 
In this section, it is argued that the development of complexity theories in recent years 
undermines the reductionist approach of neoclassical economics, and provides an 
alternative theoretical framework which resonates with the intellectual legacy of 
Thorstein Veblen and the old institutionalism. 
Complex, non-linear systems have been studied the discipline of economics in the last 
decades, in a clear rupture with the neoclassical paradigm. The emergence of chaos 
theory, and its application to economic thought, is representative of this tendency. 
As the biologist Ernst Mayr (1985) asserts: 
"Nowhere in the inanimate world can one find a system, even a complex system, that 
has the ordered internal cohesion and coadaptation of even the simplest of biological 
systems. And this requires an entirely different approach from that of the classical 
philosophy of science". 
Scholars working under a theoretical framework which is currently labelled 
“complexity theory” develop non-linear computer systems with heterogeneous agents. 
The Santa Fe Institute (SFI) is one of the leading organisations in which this research is 
developed. Santa Fe’s models undermine the foundations of neoclassical paradigm, in 
the sense that they display structures dependent on specific emergent networks and 
complex dynamics. This is opposite to the idea that macroeconomic theory must be 
based in solid ‘microfoundations’ such as the assumption of utility-maximizing 
individuals (Prasch, 2000). This approach also refuses the possibility of studying society 
assuming it behaves as if it were an individual, which underlies general equilibrium 
theory (Lavoie, 1992). In these complex systems, as the structure of the economy in 
unknowable in advance, agents’ strategies and expectations are adaptive and 
dependent on the environment in which they are embedded, which distinguishes them 
from New Institutional Economics “bounded rationality” models, as that of Williamson 
(1985) or North (1986). 
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Although the sciences of complexity do not reject causal links, they argue sometimes it 
is difficult to identify them clearly. Therefore, they emphasize historically dependent 
explanations and emergent properties (in line with the philosophy of Veblen). 
Therefore, complexity approaches and Veblenian-style theory have some common 
ideas regarding the heterogeneity of individuals and the psychological factors 
underlying human action, as well as the notion of a constant evolution of the 
institutional structure. 
There is already some important literature trying to link complexity analysis and 
economics (Arthur et al., 1997; Louçã, 1997; Rosser, 1999; Colander, 2000; Kirman, 
2010). 
Another stream of research which has evolved in recent years is chaos theory. The 
application of chaos theory to the study of economics may be traced back to Benoit 
Mandelbrot, who wrote some relevant papers in economics in the 1960’s. Mandelbrot 
explained his research was intended to explore indeterministic phenomena, such as 
turbulence, weather prediction or economics (Mirowski, 1990). The ideas of 
irregularity and randomness are central to his works, and he strongly criticised 
neoclassical economics for focusing exclusively in studying conservative and 
deterministic systems which did not reflect reality. 
Mathematicians of chaos argue chaos theory “brings a new challenge to the 
reductionist view that a system can be understood by breaking it down and studying 
each piece” (Crutchfield et al., 1986). 
A full meaning of chaos is provided by Sunny Auyang (1998): 
“A deterministic dynamic system is regular if initially nearby paths stay close together, 
chaotic if they separate at an exponential rate. Exponential divergence makes chaotic 
processes unpredictable in the long run because it amplifies tiny errors in the initial 
conditions.” 
Richard Goodwin (1990) also offered an explanation on dynamic systems: 
“Dynamical systems display themselves as attractors and/or repellors. There are 
motions into or out of fixed points (or equilibria). There are also well-defined motions 
such as periodic. The interesting and difficult cases are the chaotics (more soberbly 
called aperiodics) which are not yet, and possibly will never be, fully understood, 
precisely because they are ever-changing.” 
Goodwin’s dynamic models endogenously generated irregular tendencies due to these 
chaotic attractors. Chaos theory has shown that even deterministic systems can 
produce randomness. If we assume reality is non-linear, it means we have to treat its 
descriptive models as if they were unpredictable. Rather than rejecting causality, it is 
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acknowledged not all causes may be identified. Emergent properties, path-
dependency and irreversibility are key features of chaotic systems (Arthur, 1989). The 
implications of this approach are quite clear – precise predictability is undermined by 
non-linear and chaotic tendencies. 
Hodgson (2013) suggests the limited capacities of prediction of agent-based modelling 
and other techniques for dealing with complex systems might be a possible 
explanation of why it has not yet become an established theoretical framework in 
academia. 
Therefore, chaos literature reveals “the blurring of the boundaries between order and 
chaos” (Mirowski, 1990). 
In line with Veblenian institutionalism, Bateira (2010) describes social relations as 
“units that emerge from person’s interactions. In their multiple interconnections, social 
relations form roles and positions in order to specialise and pattern individuals’ 
interactions; roles and positions in turn are organised into networks (themselves 
elementary ‘systems’) that form layers of social structures. Some of those networks 
have highly dense nonlinear relations with multiple feedback and feedforward links. 
These connections originate a complex self-organising structure that emerges as a 
unity, a social system displaying properties of its own.” 
This perspective provides and argument for the existence of a link between ‘old’ 
institutionalism and recent complexity theories. Veblen’s analysis of institutional 
mutation and agents’ processes of adaptation to recurring changes in the economic 
structure builds on the notion of ‘non-equilibrium’ as an endogenous aspect of socio-
economic evolution. Therefore, ‘old’ institutionalism resonates with modern 
complexity theories which develop dynamic economic models. 
 
Conclusion 
This essay presented a short history of evolutionary thought in economics, from its 
origins in the works of Thorstein Veblen to recent developments in complexity 
theories. It also discussed the conceptual framework of the ‘old’ institutionalism, and 
presented it as a necessary coherent alternative to the contemporary dominant 
paradigm. There is already some important literature on the legacy of Thorstein 
Veblen and his evolutionary program (Louçã and Perlman, 2000; Hodgson, 2004). 
A Darwinian perspective allows social sciences to overcome the problem of agency and 
structure, as it explains the relations between said agents and structures as a causal 
process through time. Human behaviour involves instincts, habits, deliberation and 
social interactions. The processes of interactions between individuals, and between 
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them and their cultural and natural environment may help to explain the emergence of 
systemic properties which are not found in the parts alone. 
The Darwinian evolutionary approach requires a layered ontology, since it presents 
several levels of analysis: the material, the psychic and the social one. This anti-
reductionist approach also points to the possibility of a macroeconomic level of 
analysis. 
It may be argued that ‘critical realism’ is a stream of research in line with Veblen’s 
legacy. Critical realists (Archer et al., 1998; Lawson, 1997) call for an analytical 
distinction between individual’s interactions and social systems, emphasizing social 
structures “have an historical dimension based on material and discursive resources, 
which in the overall are not reducible to current agency and interpersonal relations.” 
(Bateira, 2010). This perspective resonates with an emergentist philosophy which 
describes the interaction of human agency and society’s structural levels as a complex 
relation. Critical realists highlight the complexity of economic phenomena, the 
fundamental role of uncertainty and the recognition of heterogeneity among agents as 
crucial features of any theory attempting to analyse real-world events. 
An evolutionary economic theory is needed to overcome the current paradigm. This 
implies setting a coherent theoretical framework which may build on the notions of 
recent approaches such as critical realism and complexity and chaos theories, thus 
reviving the ‘old’ institutionalism concepts. 
Since mainstream economics has been “based for a long time in what we might call a 
linear orthodoxy” (Louçã, 2000), an evolutionary approach needs to defy this static 
view of the economy, and develop an alternative based on ‘heretic’ non-linear and 
chaotic notions. The economy must therefore be presented as a living, adaptive and 
unpredictable organism. 
More than a century ago, Veblen (1898a) wrote: 
“Probably no economist today has either the hardihood or the inclination to say that 
the science has now reached a definitive formulation, either in the detail of results or as 
regards the fundamental features of theory.” 
The contemporary relevance of this statement is noteworthy, as it remarkably applies 
to the current state of economics. It helps to make the case for the need of alternative 
conceptual frameworks to defy orthodoxy canons. In order to develop a modern 
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